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DISREGARDING THE ENTITY OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
CHARLES HoRowiTz*
(Continued)t
IV.
THE NATURE OF THE DuTy ENFORCED
It is illuminating to observe the rather broad field in which courts
have held the doctrine of disregarding the corporate entity applicable
65
in an apparent attempt to enforce the duty owing.
Duties imposed by common law or equity are frequently enforced
by piercing the corporate entity. Thus cases in which a corporation
seeks to resist liability for the negligence of its subsidiary or predeces6
sor by asserting the independent character of the latter are frequent.
Cases of this character are to be distinguished from negligence cases
decided on the theory of joint tort feasor, or even express authority
to commit the tort in question. Such grounds make, unnecessary the
resort to the doctrine of disregarding the entity, the assigned grounds
being enough. 7 Other cases of tort involving the disregard of the
0
entity are cases of libel, 68 false representation, 9 fraud,7 patent in*Of the Seattle Bar.
tThe first instalment of this article appears at 14 WASH. L. Rav. 285.
6It is particularly intended to apply to the following classes of cases
invokink, the doctrine: (1) parent and subsidiary; (2) merged, consolidated
and successor corporations; (3) one-man corporations either organized
and manipulated or merely manipulated for the transaction of the individual's business; (4) miscellaneous. While an attempt has been made
to call attention to the many cases on the subject, no attempt has been
made to cite them all.
"Holbrook Cabot & Rollins Corp. v. Perkins, 147 Fed. 166 (C. C. A. 1st,
1906); Chicago Econ. Fuel Co. v. Myers, 168 Ill. 139, 48 N. E. 66 (1897);
Chesapeake Stone Co. v. Holbrook, 168 Ky. 128, 181 S. W. 953 (1916);
Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Carter, 226 Ky. 561, 10 S. W. (2d) 1064 (1927);
James McNeil & Bro. Co. v. Crucible Steel Co., 207 Pa. 493, 56 Atl. 1067
(1904); Towles & Co. v. Miles, 131 Tenn. 79, 173 S. W. 439 (1915); Buie
v. Chicago R. L & P. Ry. Co., 95 Tex. 51, 65 S. W. 27 (1901); Oriental
Inv. Co. v. Barclay, 25 Tex. Civ. App. 543, 64 S. W. 80 (1901); Wilson v.
Wash. Concrete Pipe Co., 178 Wash. 545, 35 P. (2d) 71 (1934); Ziemer
v. Bretting Mfg. Co., 147 Wis. 252, 133 N. W. 139 (1911) (predecessor).
"Jury question may be presented as to correct theory of liability. See
Jefferson Co. Burial Soc. v. Cotton, 222 Ala. 578, 133 So. 256 (1930);
Chesapeake Stone Co. v. Holbrook, 168 Ky. 128, 181 S. W. 953 (1916).
"Finnish Temperance Society Sovittaja v. Publishing Co., 238 Mass.
345, 130 N. E. 845 (1921).
"Portsmouth Cotton Oil Ref. Co. v. Bank, 280 Fed. 879 (ME D. Ala.,
1922); Rice v. Sanger Bros., 27 Ariz. 15, 229 Pac. 397 (1924); Damerel v.
North Amer. Bond & Mtg. Co., 133 Cal. App. 290, 24 P. (2d) 237 (1933).
"Lim Timber Co. v. United States, 236 U. S. 574 (1915); Clark v. Mill-
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fringement,' conveyance in fraud of creditors,7 2 purchase by a fidu73
and
ciary of trust property through a corporate "instrumentality",
4
misappropriation of assets." These illustrations are obviously not
7 5

exhaustive.

Rights and duties created by contract have been frequently enforced, the courts purporting to apply the doctrine of disregard.7 6 Thus,
where a person under a contractual duty not to compete attempts to
do so by organizing and manipulating a corporation for that purpose
on the plea that the corporation and not himself is competing, both
he and the corporation will be restrained from doing so, the separate
entity of the corporation being disregarded.77 Again, an agreement to
sap, 197 Cal. 765, 242 Pac. 918 (1926); Isaacson v. Union Trust Co. of San
Diego, 273 Pac. 119 (1928), 275 Pac. 529 (1929), 286 Pac. 1017 (1930), 210
Cal. 473, 292 Pac. 448 (1930); Ehlers v. Bankers Fire Ins. Co., 108 Neb.
756, 189 N. W. 159 (1922); see Doriovan v. Purtell, 216 Ill.
629, 75 N. E. 334
(1905). The use of an instrumentality corporation to obtain property free
of equities on plea of bona fide purchaser was frustrated. Simmons Creek
Coal Co. v. Doran, 142 U. S. 417 (1892); Wilson Coal Co. v. United States,
188 Fed. 545 (C. C. A. 9th, 1911); Noble v. Joseph Burnett Co., 208 Mass.
75, 94 N. E. 289 (1911). Such cases charge the corporation with notice
of the equities.
"Searchlight Horn Co. v. American Graphophone Co., 240 Fed. 745
(D. Conn., 1916).
"In re Bullwinkle, 111 Fed. 364 (S.D. N. Y., 1901); Blanc v. Paymaster
Mining Co., 95 Cal. 524, 30 Pac. 765 (1892); Kellogg v. Douglas County
Bank, 58 Kan. 43, 48 Pac. 587 (1897); Matchan v. Phoenix Land Inv. Co.,
159 Minn. 132, 198 N. W. 417 (1924); Terhune v. Skinner, 45 N. J. Eq. 344,
19 Atl. 377 (1889); Bennett v. Minott, 28 Ore. 339, 39 Pac. 997, 44 Pac. 288
(1895); Montgomery Web Co. v. Dienelt, 133 Pa. 585, 19 Atl. 428 (1890);
Roberts v. Hughes Co., 86 Vt. 76, 83 Atl. 807 (1912). In cases of conveyances in fraud of creditors, the stock or property of the subsidiary
corporation may be administered by the trustee in bankruptcy or receiver
of the assets of the parent. In re Muncie Pulp Co., 139 Fed. 546 (C. C. A.
2d, 1905) (stock-bankrupt's receiver); Kimberley Coal Co. v. Douglas,
45 F. (2d) 25 (C. C. A. 6th, 1930) (equity receiver); Isaacson v. Union
Trust Co. of San Diego, 210 Cal. .473, 292 Pac. 448 (1930) (trustee); Day
v. Postal Tel. Co., 66 Md. 354, 7 Atl. 608 (1887) (equity receiver). Parent
corporation cannot obtain payment of a claim in bankruptcy against its
subsidiary. Finch Co. v. Robie, 12 F. (2d) 360 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926); Clere
Clothing Co. v. Union Trust & Say. Bank, 224 Fed. 363 (C. C. A. 9th,
1915); see Rembar, Claims Against Affiliated Companies in Reorganization
(1939) 39 COL. L. REV. 907; Comment (1937) 36 MICH. L. REV. 88.
'Mosher v. Lee, 32 Ariz. 560, 261 Pac. 35 (1927); State ex rel. Schull v.
Liberty National Bank, 331 Mo. 386, 53 S. W. (2d) 899 (1932); MacFadden v.
Jenkins, 40 N. D. 422, 169 N. W. 151 (1918); see Charles F. Garrigues Co. v.
International Agric. Corp., 159 App. Div. 877, 144 N. Y. Supp. 982 (1913);
cf. In re Culhane's Estate, 269 Mich. 68, 256 N. W. 807 (1934).
"In re Auditore's Adm'x, 223 App. Div. 654, 229 N. Y. Supp. 414 (1928).
"See Douglas and Shanks, InsulationFrom Liability Through Subsidiary
Corporations (1929) 39 YALE L. J. 193, 195.
'Maloney Tank Mfg. Co. v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 49 F. (2d)
146 (C. C. A. 10th, 1931); Dixie Coal Co. v. Williams, 221 Ala. 331, 128
So. 799 (1930). See Lowry Watkins Mtg. Co. v. Turley-Bullington Co., 248
Ky. 285, 58 S. W. (2d) 591 (1933).
"Kamow v. Simplex Cloth-Cutting Machine Co., 109 Misc. Rep. 358, 179
N. Y. Supp. 682 (Sup. Ct., 1919); Booth & Co. v. Seibold, 37 Misc. Rep. 101,
74 N. Y. Supp. 776 (Sup. Ct., 1902); Kramer v. Old, 119 N. C. 1, 25 S. E. 813
(1896). See LePage Co. v. Russian Cement Co., 51 Fed. 941 (C. C. A.
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turn over a business to another cannot be evaded through the device
of obtaining such business through a corporate subsidiary and then
refusing to make the transfer. 78 Likewise, the transfer of a lease to a
corporate instrumentality for the purpose of evading the obligation
to pay royalties,7 or for the purpose of evading other terms of a
lease,80 will be frustrated through application of the doctrine. Nor will
a court permit one to escape the necessity of observing a contract
providing plaintiffs with an exclusive selling agency as long as defendants should manufacture lumber, defendants later manufacturing lumber through a corporate instrumentality and claiming to be no longer
engaged in the business; 8 ' or, being unable to sue, organize a corporate
82
instrumentality for the purpose of being enabled to do so in its name.
Nor will a corporation be permitted to recover on a fire insurance policy
issued to it where the incendiarism was occasioned by the act of the sole
creditor and beneficial owner in control of the corporation to whom
the proceeds of the policy would go. The separate personality of the
corporation will be disregarded.8 3 Similarly, a defense good against
all the stockholders has been held good against the corporation, and
5
vice versa,84 as, for example, the defense of res judicata"
or estoppel. 6
Closely related to questions of evasion are cases involving obstruction
to the proper enforcement of duties contractual in character. The
entity will be disregarded to resist such obstruction. 7
1st, 1892). Assignor of such contract after assignment to instrumentality
corporation may enforce it against person wrongfully competing. Ragsdale v. Nagel, 106 Cal. 332, 39 Pac. 628 (1895).
I Hollywood Cleaning & Pressing Co. v. Hollywood Laundry Service,
Inc., 12 P. (2d) 145 (Cal. App., 1932). This case was subsequently reversed
by reason of strict adherence to the entity theory in view of the state of
the record. 217 Cal. 124, 17 P. (2d) 709 (1932).
,'Higgins v. California Pet. & Asphalt Co., 147 Cal. 363, 81 Pac. 1070
(1905).
bShea v. Leonis, - Cal. -, 92 P. (2d) 400 (1939); Winestine v. Rose
Cloak & Suit Co., 93 Conn. 633, 107 Atl. 500 (1919); Fors v. Farrell, 271
Mich. 358, 260 N. W. 886 (1935); Kelley v. Von Herberg, 184 Wash. 165,
50 81
P. (2d) 23 (1935).
Hagy v. Maguire, 147 Pa. 187, 23 Atl. 806 (1892).
"New York & Brooklyn Ferry Co. v. Mayor of N. Y., 146 N. Y. 145,
40 N. E. 785 (1895); cf. Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown
& Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U. S.518 (1928).
'Felsenthal v. Northern Ass. Co., 284 Ill. 343, 120 N. E. 268 (1918).
"Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Barber, 67 Neb. 644, 93 N. W. 1024 (1903); see
notes 85 and 86, infra.
*Croke v. Farmers Highline Canal Co., 71 Colo. 514, 208 Pac. 466 (1922);
Covington v. McIntire, 111 Kan. 79, 206 Pac. 319 (1922). See United States
Envelope Co. v. Franso Paper Co., 221 Fed. 79 (D.C. Conn, 1915); Hart
Steel Co. v. R. R. Supply Co., 244 U. S.294 (1917) (judgment against subsidiary res judicata as to parent corporation).
8Rutz v. Obear, 15 Cal. App. 435, 115 Pac. 67 (1911); Relley v. Campbell, 134 Cal. 175, 66 Pac. 220 (1901); see Burnett Coal Mining Co. v.
Schrepferman, 77 Ind. App. 45, 133 N. E. 34 (1921).
"Curtis, Jones & Co. v. Bank, 43 Colo. 391, 96 Pac. 172 (1908); Breman
Say. Bank v. Branch-Crookes Co., 104 Mo. 425, 16 S.W. 209 (1891); Hawkins v. Bryan, 128 Okla. 27, 261 Pac. 167 (1927); Clark v. Schwaegler, 104

-
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Duties or debts created by contract include the duty to pay. The
desirability of enforcing payment of debts incurred does not necessarily
mean that the doctrine of disregarding the corporate entity of the
immediate debtor may be invoked in order to render liable a solvent
defendant.8 8 Nevertheless, the nonpayment of debts frequently gives
rise to an attempt to utilize the doctrine. The evasion phase of this
matter frequently relates not so much to the attempt of a parent corporation to escape liability as it does to escaping financial responsibility
for an admitted liability of the immediate debtor. Thus, attempts of
individuals or firms to organize a corporation for the purpose of placing and dealing with their property in its name so as to place that
property beyond the reach of their creditors are frequently frustrated,
courts treating the corporate property as that of the firm or individual.8 9
Likewise, an attempt to prefer a creditor by having him become a stockholder and creditor in a corporation to which the insolvent debtor
conveyed his property will be held ineffective for such purpose.90
Closely related to the subject of contractual duty is the duty usually
contractual in character successfully asserted against a corporation by
reason solely of the acts of its only stockholder. The corporation being
treated as his mere instrumentality, its separate personality is disregarded and it is held liable for his acts. 91
The attempted obstruction or evasion of statutory duties92 by use of
the concept of corporate entity furnishes many cases on the subject. 3
Thus, an individual cannot use the mails to defraud by organizing a
Wash. 12, 175 Pac. 300 (1918); Associated Oil Co. v. Seiberling Rubber
Co., 172 Wash. 204, 19 P. (2d) 940 (1933). Where two sole stockholders
and dummy directors are involved, the rule is the same. First Nat. Bank
v. Mining Co., 89 Fed. 439 (C. C. D. Idaho, 1898); Carney v. Penn. Realty
Co., 174 App. Div. 86, 159 N. Y. Supp. 273 (1916). See Taylor Feed
Pen Co. v. Bank, 181 S. W. 534 (Tex. Civ. App., 1915).
"'Pittsburgh Reflector Co. v. Dwyer & Rhodes Co., 173 Wash. 552, 23
P. (2d) 1114 (1933).
sWeintraub v. Superior Ct., 91 Cal. App. 763, 267 Pac. 733 (1928):
Third Avenue Co. v. Keely, 111 Fla. 46. 149 So. 30 (1933); Hancock v.
Holbrook, 40 La. Ann. 53, 3 So. 351 (1888); Trachman v. Trugman, 117
N. J. Eq. 167, 175 Atl. 147 (1934); Keating v. Hammerstein, 209 N. Y.
Supp. 769 (1921). See Andres v. Morgan, 62 Ohio St. 236, 56 N. E. 875
(1900). See Comment (1920) 29 YALE L. J.659. See also Jones v. Commagere, - La. App. -, 189 So. 603. (1939) (garnishment of salary).
'°Folsom v. Detrick Co., 85 Md. 52, 36 Atl. 446 (1897).
"'Wenban Estate Co. v. Hewlett, 193 Cal. 675, 227 Pac. 723 (1924);
Rafter v. Richard K. Fox Publishing Co., 206 App. Div. 389, 201 N. Y.
Supp. 401 (1923), afi'd, 238 N. Y. 567, 144 N. E. 894 (1924); Roberts v.
Hilton Land Co., 45 Wash. 464, 88 Pac. 946 (1907); see Breslin v. FriesBreslin Co., 70 N. J. Law 274, 58 Atl. 313 (1904), and National Bank v.
Pingree Co., 62 Utah 259, 218 Pac. 552 (1923).
12Or constitutional duties. Lake Shore Drive Building Corporation v.
Hughes, 369 Ill. 476, 17 N. E. (2d) 38 (1938); Wheeling Bridge & Term.
Ry. Co. v. Gilmore, 8 Ohio C. C. 658, 4 Ohio C. D. 366 (1894).
"This phase is generalized in Barbour v. Thomas, 7 F. Supp. 271, 277
(E. D. Mich., 1933) as follows: ". . . the corporate concept cannot be
employed to evade a statute or defeat its intent."
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corporation controlled by him and carrying on his fraudulent scheme
in its name. The crime is his, not merely the corporation's.9 4 Nor may
railway carriers in violation of the Commodities Clause of the Hepburn
Act organize a corporate instrumentality for the purpose of engaging
in the business of manufacturing, mining, producing or owning commodities. 5 Likewise, a corporation may not be used to enable its
stockholders to violate the Federal Anti-Trust Law,6 or the Clayton
Act;9 7 or to shield stockholders from the payment of stock assessments by claiming that the corporation rather than they themselves
owe them; 98 or to evade or obstruct liability for taxes; 99 or to collect
taxes not otherwise assessable; 10 or to enable the creation of monopoly; 10T or to permit the violation of rate statutes; 02 or to enable the
granting of rebates in violation of the Elkins Act.103 Nor may a corporate instrumentality be used for the purpose of exercising the right
of eminent domain, which right would not otherwise exist; 1 4 nor
may corporate personality be used to collusively confer jurisdiction on
the federal courts, 0 5 nor to prevent such jurisdiction from attaching;'10 6 nor may a foreign corporation prohibited from doing business
in a state organize another corporation for that purpose; 0 7 nor may
individuals through the device of a corporation obtain coal lands in
excess of the statutory maximum.0 8 Other illustrations involving the
enforcement of statutory duty by application of the doctrine of disregard will be found in the footnotes. 0 9
"Redmond v. United States, 8 F. (2d) 24 (C. C. A. 1st, 1925).
'United States v. Delaware L. & W. R. R. Co., 238 U. 5.. 516 (1915);
United States v. Lehigh Valley R. R. Co., 220 U. S. 257 (1911).
"Northern Securities Co. v. U. S., 193 U. S. 197 (1904).
"Federal Trade Comm. v. Thatcher Mfg. Co., 5 F. (2d) 615 (C. C. A.
3d, 1925).
"Barbour v. Thomas, 7 F. Supp. 271 (E. D. Mich., 1933); Corker v. Soper,
53 F. (2d) 190 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931). See Kelley v. Von Herberg, 184 Wash.
165, 50 P. (2d) 23 (1935).
"Coudon v. Tait, 56 F. (2d) 208 (D. Md., 1932); United States v. Barwin
Realty Co.., 25 F. (2d) 1003 (E. D. N. Y. 1928); Palmolive Co. v. Conway, 43
F. (2d) 226 (W. D. Wis., 1930); Commonwealth v. Muir, 170 Ky. 435, 186
S. W. 194 (1916) (entity regarded to defeat a claimed exemption). See
Osgood v. Tax Comm., 235 Mass. 88, 126 N. E. 371 (1920) (entity regarded
to increase tax revenue). See Comment (1932) 80 U. or PA. L.APR 892.
'Miller v. Milwaukee, 272 U. S. 713 (1927).
'"See Ford v. Chicago Milk Shippers, 155 III. 166, 39 N. E. 651 (1895);
State v. Creamery Pkg. Mg. Co., 110 Minn. 415, 126 N. W. 126 (1910).
"'Chicago, M & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Minneapolis Civic Ass'n, 247 U. S.
490 (1918).
"'United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., 142 Fed. 247
(E. D. Wis., 1905).
20'Parkside Cemetery Ass'n v. Cleveland, B. & G. Lake T. Co., 93 Ohio
St 161, 112 N. E. 596 (1915).
1Mller & Lux Co. v. East Side Canal & Irr. Co., 211 U. S. 293 (1908).
"'Marshall v. B. & 0. Ry. Co., 16 How. 314 (U. S. 1853).
"'State v. Safford, 117 Ohi6 576, 159 N. E. 829 (1927).
"1'United States v. Trinidad Coal & Coking Co., 137 U. S. 160 (1890).
See United States v. Munday, 222 U. S. 175 (1911).
"'Linn & Lane Timber Co. v. United States, 236 U. S. 574 (1915)
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What has been noted concerning the evasion of statutory duties suggests the query: Will the entity be disregarded for the purpose of positively enforcing the duty, rather than merely resisting an attempted
evasion? Like the frustration of attempted evasion, the court seeks
to make the statutory duty effective. The answer to the query proprosed would seem to be in the affirmative, and the cases so hold. 110
The Supreme Court of the United States has stated the rule as to
duty (or its correlative right) as follows:
"As a general rule a corporation and the stockholders are
deemed separate entities * * *. Of course, the rule is subject

to the qualification that the separate entities may be disregarded in exceptional situations where it otherwise would
present an obstacle to the due protection or enforcement of
public or private rights.""'
The foregoing illustrations of duty, common law, contractual and
statutory, assume that unjustified loss would occur to the recipient of
the duty owed if the entity were not disregarded. 12 But a person may,
even under such circumstances, place himself in such a position that
he may not invoke the doctrine. The loss is not "unjustified". Thus if
one knowingly agrees to accept the sole liability of a subsidiary corporation or individual, its entity cannot be disregarded for the purpose
of visiting liability upon the parent individual or corporation. The
theory of election, 1 ' or possibly that of estoppel," 4 is applicable.
Again, if at the time the subsidiary incurred the obligation it was
independent, later, however, becoming a mere instrumentality, the
(Statutes of Limitations); In re Rieger Kapner & Altmark, 157 Fed. 609
(E. D. Ohio, 1907) (bankruptcy); Robert Findley Mfg. Co. v. Hygrade
Lighting & Fixture Corp., 288 Fed. 80 (E. D. N. Y., 1923) (patent laws);
M. Lowenstein & Sons v. British-Amer. Mfg. Co., 300 Fed. 853 (D. Conn.,
1924); State v. Davies, 176 Wash. 100, 28 P. (2d) 322 (1934) (banking);
State v. Milbrath, 138 Wis. 354, 120 N. W. 252 (1909) (dealing with embezzlement); cf. Jenkins v. Moyse, 254 N. Y. 319, 172 N. E. 521 (1930)
(usury); Tucker v. Binenstock, 310 Pa. 254, 165 AtI. 247 (1933) (prohibition laws).
" McKinley v. Wheeler, 130 U. S. 630 (1889); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Llewellyn, 248 U. S. 71 (1918); Thomas v. Chisholm, 13 Colo. 105, 21 Pac. 1019
(1889); Schufeldt v. Smith, 139 Mo. 367, 40 S. W. 887 (1897) (Statute of
Frauds); In re Bush's Estate, 124 Misc. Rep. 674, 209 N. Y. Supp. 776 (Surr.
Ct., 1925) (will); Boston & Texas Corp. v. Guarantee Life Ins. Co., 233
S. W. 1022 (Tex. Civ. App., 1921).
"'New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 435 (1934); cf. note 93,
supra.
"'On the other hand, to avoid violation of duty and consequent loss,
the corporate entity may be regarded. Continental Securities Inv. Co. v.
Rawson, 208 Cal. 228, 280 Pac. 954 (1929); Voll v. Zelch, 198 Iowa 1333, 201
N. W. 33 (1924).
""New York Trust Co. v. Carpenter, 250 Fed. 668 (C. C. A. 6th, 1918);
Pierce v. National Bank of Commerce, 13 F. (2d) 40 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926),
cert. denied, 273 U. S. 730 (1926); Texas Co. of Mexico, S. A. v. Roos, 43
F. (2d) 1 (C. C. A. 5th, 1930); In re John Koke Co., 38 F. (2d) 232 (C. C.
A. 9th, 1930); General Disc. Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 5 F. Supp. 709 (E.
D. Mich, 1933); Lowenthal Securities Co. v. White Paving Co., 351 Ill.
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creditor cannot hold the new parent corporation liable for the old obligation" 5 unless it has, for example, deprived the subsidiary of assets
which should otherwise have been available to satisfy the creditor's
claim. 116
It has been suggested that cases of evasion of duties do not necessarily require a court to disregard the corporate entity. It is argued
that they" merely require the scope of the duty owed to be enlarged
so as to become enforceable against the obligor and his controlled corporation regarded as an entity. Thus, in case of a contract not to
compete, the contract must be construed to apply to the obligor's instrumentality corporation forbidding competition by it as well. Again,
in case of a conveyapce of property in fraud of creditors to an instrumentality corporation, the law prohibiting such conveyance must be
held to have been violated by the grantor through such corporation
regarded as an entity."17 This view of the matter is in many cases
logically possible and deserves more consideration than it has received.
However, the suggested mode of stating the matter is not generally
relied on; most cases of duty evasion expressly proceed on the footing
that the corporate entity is disregarded.
V.
ENFORCEMENT OF

DuTY

OWED WHEN THE RIGHTS OF THIRD PARTIES

ARE NOT PREJUDICED

Occasionally the doctrine of disregard can be invoked to enforce a
duty owing by the parties involved as a matter of convenience, no
rights of third persons being involved or prejudiced. In such cases the
285, 184 N. E. 310 (1932); Carozza v. Federal Finance & Credit Co., 149
Md. 223, 131 Atl. 332 (1925); Pagel, Horton & Co. v. Harmon Paper Co.,
236 App. Div. 47, 258 N. Y. Supp. 168 (1932). See Weaver v. Atlantian
Const. Co., 84 Cal. App. 154, 258 Pac. 111 (1927). Cf. the rule that one
dealing with a corporation is estopped to deny its corporate existence.
Reynolds v. St. Johns Grand Lodge, 171 La. 395, 131 So. 186 (1930).
""See Hunter v. Baker, 225 Fed. 1006, 1016 (N. D. N. Y., 1915); Pacific
Power & Light Co. v. Norris, 194 Wash. 91, 77 P. (2d) 379 (1938); cf. Joint
Stock Co. v. National City Bank, 210 App. Div. 665, 206 N. Y. Supp. 476
(1924). See note 113, supra.
"25Allen v. Philadelphia Co., 265 Fed. 807 (W. D. Pa., 1919), 265 Fed.
817 (C. C. A. 3d, 1920); see Hooper-Mankin Co. v. Mathew Addy Co., 4 F.
(2d) 187 (C. C. A. 6th, 1925).
"16Interstate Tel. Co. v. B. & Co. Tel. Co., 51 Fed. 49, 54 Fed. 50 (C. C. A.
4th, 1893); see Hunter v. Baker Motor Vehicle Co., 225 Fed. 1006 (N. D.
N. Y., 1915), 238 Fed. 894 (C. C. A. 2d, 1916); and Majestic Co. v. Orpheum
Circuit, 21 F. (2d) 720 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927); cf. In re Eilers Music House,
270 Fed. 915 (C. C. A. 9th, 1921). A contract between a sole stockholder
and his corporation which if enforced will strip the legal entity of its
property working to the prejudice of an innocent third person should
not be enforced. See Chicago & Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Miller, 91 Mich.
166, 51 N. W. 981 (1892).
2"'Canfield, The Scope and Limits of the Corporate Entity Theory (1917)

17 COL. L. REv. 128.
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principles heretofore discussed" may also (but not necessarily) justify
application of the doctrine of disregard. Cases cited in support of
illustrations given in this section should therefore be considered in the
light of both possible explanations, either or both of which may apply.
Thus, two owners of a corporation have been treated as partners by
disregarding the corporate entity.11" In a suit to quiet title, the court
has disregarded the entity of a family corporation, no corporate creditors' rights being prejudiced."" A corporation has become liable on
the contract of its sole stockholder.' 20 In a suit on a note by a corporation, the defendant is permitted to set off a debt owed to him by the
corporation's sole stockholder.' 2 ' A sole stockholder has been personally held liable for breach of a corporate contract.122 A sole stockholder
has been permitted or compelled to pay,'12 or secure his personal debts
with corporate property,2 4 subject to the rights of existing creditors.
Likewise he has been forced to pay corporate debts with his private
property.125 Sole stockholders have been permitted to assert corporate rights." 21 In cases of this character the entity is properly disregarded because the rights of the parties involved may be finally
determined without regard to the corporate entity and without prejudice
to the rights of third persons. Indeed, this principle seems to be implicit
in the number of decisions involving one-man corporations, the reason
for disregarding the entity of which seems difficult to otherwise justify.'

27

"'Spe
notes 144 to 147, infra.
'11'Komow v. Simplex Cloth-Cutting Machine Co., 109 Misc. Rep. 358,
179 N. Y. Supp. 682 (Sup. Ct., 1919).
"'Sheffield Co. v. Hoe & Co., 173 Wash. 489, 23 P. (2d) 876 (1933).
1"See note 91, supra. Grotheer v. Meyer Rosenberg, 11 Cal. App. (2d)
268, 53 P. (2d) 996 (1936).
"'Knight v. Burns, 22 Ohio App. 482, 154 N. E. 345 (1926); Western
Securities Co. v. Spiro, 62 Utah 623, 221 Pac. 856 (1923); cf. State v. Weston
Bank, 125 Neb. 612, 251 N. W. 164 (1933), and Gallagher v. Germania
Brewing Co., 53 Minn. 214, 54 N. W. 1115 (1893) (refusing setoff).
"'Whitman v. Whittingham, 85 Cal. App. 140, 259 Pac. 63 (1927); Sweet
v. Watson's Nursery, - Cal. App. -, 92 P. (2d) 812 (1939) (two-man
corporation); see Camp v. Gress, 250 U. S. 308 (1919); cf. Louisville &
Nashville R. R. Co. v. Nield, 186 Ky. 17, 216 S. W. 62 (1919).
"'Lost Burros Gold Mining Co. v. Bank, 83 Cal. App. 679, 257 Pac. 209
(1927); United State Gypsum Co. v. Mackey Wall Plaster Co., 60 Mont 132,
199 Pac. 249 (1921); Stony Brook Lbr. Co. v. Blackman, 286 Pa. 305, 133
Atl. 556 (1926); see Scales v. Holje, 41 Cal. App. 733, 183 Pac. 308 (1919)
(unless existing corporate creditors prejudiced). See also In re Wilson's
Estate, 85 Ore. 604, 167 Pac. 580 (1917).
"'See First Nat. Bank v. Winchester, 119 Ala. 168, 24 So. 351 (1898);
Sargent v. Palace Cafe Co., 175 Cal. 737, 167 Pac. 146 (1917). Cf. sole
stockholder may in his own name execute a valid mortgage of corporate
property. Swift v. Smith, 65 Md. 428, 5 Atl. 534 (1886); Phoenix Assurance
Co. v. Deavenport, 16 Tex. Civ. App. 283, 41 S. W. 399 (1897) (conveyance).
'See notes 91 and 120, supra.
"See Panich v. Curtis, Owen, Fuller Corporation, 124 S. W. (2d) 619
(Mo., 1938); Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, 327 Pa. 433, 194 Atl.
631 (1937).
'"See Sheffield Co. v. Hoe & Co., 173 Wash. 489, 23 P. (2d) 876 (1933);
Fuller, The Incorporated Individual: A Study of the One-Man Company
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VI.
SUGGESTED TESTS FOR DISREGARDING CORPORATE ENTITY

A consideration of the elements relied on by the courts in piercing
the corporate entity gives rise to the query as to whether there are not
some common and specific principles running through the various cases
that may be profitably utilized.
It will be remembered that the formation, control and manipulation
of separate entities is intentional in character. The word "intentional"
is not used to mean secret, uncommunicated intent but rather intent
as manifested by outward act or conduct-overt intent. Thus, the
intention to obliterate corporate personality may be shown in various
ways. 128

Intimacy is, of course, evidence of such intention.

More

specifically, however, attention may be directed to manipulation, confusion of assets, payment of a subsidiary or other corporation's expenses, use of the subsidiary's property in the interest of the parent,
failure to observe formal legal requirements and- the use of the corporation to transact its owner's business. On the other hand, proof may
fall short of establishing such intention. Thus understood it becomes
at once apparent, at least in most cases, why stock ownership, common
officers, loans, common names, organization by the parent corporation
and similar facts do not necessarily establish intention to disregard the
corporate entity.1 2 a Mere intimacy is not necessarily inconsistent with

2- 9
intention to regard rather than to disregard the corporate entity.
Recognition that the facts above stated are but evidence of intent
is reminiscent of the earlier history of partnership law. The early
law seized upon various indicia of partnership, such as sharing of profits
and losses, existence of ownership and control or community of interest.
Later these came to be recognized as mere evidence of intention to be
partners, and the test of partnership established that it was the intention of the parties that determined whether partnership existed. This

(1938) 51 HARv. L. REv. 1373, 1389.
2 See notes 35 to 43, supra.
' For detail of relevant evidentiary facts, see Douglas and Shanks,
Insulation From Liability Through Subsidiary Corporations (1929) 39
YALE L. J. 193, 195; Ballantine, Separate Entity of Parent and Subsidiary
Corporations (1925) 14 CALIF. L. Rv. 12, 18, 19; cf. Elson, Legal Liability
of Holding Companies for Acts of Subsidiary Companies (1930) 15 ST.
Louis L. REv. 333-360. See Exchange Natl. Bank of Spokane v. Meikle, 61
F. (2d) 176 (C. C. A. 9th, 1932). For overt intention in tort and contract
law, see Houmus, Ta COMMON LAW, 130, 307. See Anderson, Onus Probandi and Disregard of the CorporateFiction (1932) 2 IDiAHo L. J. 189.
'"Sommer v. Yakima Motor Coach Co., 174 Wash. 638, 26 P. (2d) 92
(1933). See also: Leavenworth County v. Ry. Co., 134 U. S. 688 (1890);
Martin v. Development Co., 240 Fed. 42 (C. C. A. 9th; 1917); Proctor &
Gamble v. Newton, 289 Fed. 1013 (S. D. N. Y. 1923); Baker v. Bowie
Lumber Co., 151 La. 598, 92 So. 129 (1922); Pagel, Horton & Co. v. Harmon
Paper Co., 236 App. Div. 47, 258 N. Y. Supp. 168 (1932); Bergenthal v.
State Garage & Truck Co., 179 Wis. 42, 190 N. W. 901 (1922).
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intention was not a secret intention but rather an intention as manifested by outward act or conduct-overt intention.1 3°
However, merely because overt intent to disregard exists does not
mean that such intent will be enforced by the courts if to do so would
be to permit the achievement of purposes condemned by law. Thus, if
overt intent to regard the corporate entity or to disregard the corporate
entity is used for the purpose of violating a duty owed, such intent
should no more be enforced than would a contract, partnership or
agency for an illegal purpose. 131
However, the use of the concepts of overt intent and purpose will
not altogether explain a group of cases heretofore discussed 132 in which
overt intent to disregard does not necessarily appear. In this class
of case overt intention is not decisive. The corporate entity may be
disregarded even though there be an overt intention to regard the
entity for a proper purpose. To explain this class of cases by resort
to overt intention is to resort to intention fictional in character. The
analogy of contract and quasi-contract helps make this clear. Whereas
°contracts are enforced when the object is lawful because of the factual
intention or agreement of the parties, quasi-contracts are imposed by
law irrespective of the intention of the parties. Such obligations are
not contract obligations at all but are clothed with the semblance of
contract for the purpose of utilizing a contractual remedy. Here, too,
the reason assigned is that of doing justice.'3 3 Similarly, in the case
of trust and constructive trust, the latter is not a trust in fact based
on intention but rather one imposed by law irrespective of intention
for the purpose of utilizing a trust remedy "to do justice".134 The
principle implicit in decisions such as these is apparent in various
branches of the law and accounts for doctrines such as constructive
delivery, constructive eviction, constructive knowledge, constructive
notice, constructive possession, constructive service and similar constructive juridical facts constructed by law for the purpose of "doing
justice". So, in the class of cases of disregarding the corporate entity
now considered, the entity is disregarded irrespective of overt intent
in order to enforce a duty owing, particularly when some collateral
advantage accrues thereby, or, as the courts often say, in order "to do
justice". Unlike the case of constructive trust or contract, the court
does not treat the situation as if there were in fact a trust or a contract
but rather negatively, as if there were no corporate entity. The principle, however, is the same. Actual intent is not involved.
Bearing in mind the foregoing considerations, it is believed that the
"' 20 R. C. L. 818, 823-33.
"'RESTATEMENT, AGENCY

(1933) § 19; see also note 130, supra.

"'2See Section V, supra.

"Miller v. Schloss, 218 N. Y. 400, 407, 113 N. E. 337 (1916).
RESTITUTION (1936) § 160.

'34RESTATEMENT,
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following principles may be profitably used in solving problems involving the disregard of the corporate entity, and to furnish reasonable
limits within which the doctrine may be invoked:
1. (a) If there is an overt intention to regard or disregard the
corporate entity, effect will be given thereto unless so to do will violate
a duty owing.
(b) The overt intention is that of the corporation whose entity is
sought to be disregarded or of the person or persons owning its stock
and sought to be visited with the consequence of regard or disregard
of the corporate entity.
(c) The duty owing must be owing to the person seeking to invoke
the doctrine, and such duty may arise from common law and equity,
contract or statute.
The foregoing principles can be easily illustrated even though the
reasons assigned in the decisions (although consistent with those suggested in this paper) are not necessarily the same as those here urged.
The case of Sommer v. Yakima Motor Coach'35 illustrates a case
of an overt intention to regard the corporate entity for a proper purpose, i. e., a purpose involving the violation of no duty. In that case
the plaintiff brought an action to recover damages for the negligence
of a stage driver. He sought to recover judgment against two stage
companies on the theory that they were in substance one and the
same company. The court held that the fact that the two stage companies had identical trustees and officers and were closely allied in their
business relationships and that the one was financially irresponsible
and kept alive by the other by loans to it and by purchases of its stock,
each, however, conducting its business separately but under a close
working arrangement, did not establish a single identity in law. The
court held that the evidence did not show that there was such a commingling of affairs as to render it apparent that the corporations were
intended to function as one or that they were intended to work a fraud
on others.
The case of Grotheer v. Rosenberg38 illustrates- a case of overt
intention to regard -the corporate entity for an improper purpose, i.e.,
for the purpose of violating a duty owed. In that case an individual,
in anticipation of a judgment being rendered against him, transferred
his property to a corporation organized by him in exchange for its
shares of stock, for the purpose of conducting his business as a separate
entity. The court held that the corp6ration was liable to pay the judg'ment obtained against the individual. The intention to regard the corporation as a separate entity was frustrated because not to do so would
have been to violate the duty owed to the individual's creditor to pay
the judgment.
-174 Wash. 638, 26 P. (2d) 92 (1933).
1-111 Cal. App. (2d) 268, 53 P. (2d) 996 (1936).
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The case of Deeds v. Gilner'317 illustrates a case of overt intention
to disregard a corporate entity for a proper purpose, i. e., no duty
being violated. In that case two equal owners of the stock of a corporation disregarded the corporate entity and conducted the business
as a partnership composed of themselves. In a suit as between themselves and as between one of them and the creditors of the other, it
was held that the corporate entity would be disregarded. In such a
case it is apparent that since no duty is violated there, is no reason
for not enforcing the intention of the parties in disregarding the entity
7
of the corporation.1 1
Should there be a case involving an overt intention to disregard the
corporate entity for the purpose of violating a duty owing, the courts
will have ample precedent, by analogy at least, to refuse to disregard
the corporate entity under such circumstances.1 38
9
The case of In re Armbruster Store Co."1 illustrates the principle
that it is the overt intention of the corporation whose entity is sought
to be disregarded that may be the controlling intention that determines
whether the corporate entity should be regarded or disregarded. In that
case a new corporation was created under a reorganization plan and
was held not liable for the debts of the old corporation, the court
expressly refusing to invoke the doctrine of disregard because creditors
were estopped by their conduct from invoking the doctrine. The intention of the reorganized corporation to regard its corporate entity is
given effect, no duty to creditors being violated thereby. If, however,
a duty owed to creditors is violated, then as in the case of Sheild v.
Smith1 40 overt intention of the successor corporation should not be
given effect. In that case the corporation succeeded to the business
of a partnership, taking over its assets and issuing its stock in payment therefor. It was held liable on a debt incurred by the partnership prior to the transfer of assets. Obviously, if the successor corporation intends to regard its corporate entity, the intention is to
regard its entity for the purpose of violating a duty owed to the
creditor of the partnership, for that creditor has a right to be paid
with the assets of the partnership, possession of which has been taken
by the corporation.
However, as distinguished from cases involving successor, merged or
consolidated corporations, the more common overt intention that is
held controlling is that of the stockholder of the corporation, par'162 Va. 157, 174 S. E. 37 (1934).

'""Cf.Paul v. Univ. Motor Sales Co., 283 Mich. 587, 278 N. W. 714 (1938).
The doctrine of disregard may often be justifiably applied on the basis

either that an overt intent to disregard exists or that the overt intent to
regard involves the violation of a duty owed.
"'See notes 130 and 131, supra.
1'66 F. (2d) 110 (C. C. A. 6th, 1933).

3-53 S. D. 477, 221 N. W. 87 (1928).
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ticularly in parent and subsidiary corporation cases. Thus, in Kentucky Electric Power Co. v. Norton Coal Mining Co.,14 1 a parent corporation conducted its business separately from that of its subsidiary.
Its intention was to regard the separate entity of the subsidiary corporation. Accordingly, in that case, the court refused to give a subsidiary corporation an equitable lien on the parent corporation's realty
on account of expenditures mistakenly made on the realty of the parent
corporation, applying the general rule applicable to separate and distinct entities. In Williams v. Freeport Sulphur Co. 4 2 the court held
that a citation to a foreign parent corporation could be served on a
domestic subsidiary corporation for the reason (in effect) that the
corporation's intention was that the subsidiary corporation should be
its agent.
The doctrine of disregard is applied to enforce the duty owing to
the person for whose benefit the doctrine is invoked. The overt intention discussed above should not, however, be confused with the contention made by a complaining party. Thus, in In re John Koke Co." 3
a lender, knowing that money was borrowed for the benefit of a corporation, elected to take the promissory note of the individual who
owned eighty of its eighty-two shares of stock, the note being secured
by collateral. The court held that the lender was bound by his election
and that a claim against the corporation, which had become bankrupt,
could not be allowed. In that case the lender's contention was that
the entity should be disregarded, but the overt intention of the individual stockholder was to regard the corporate entity. Accordingly,
that intention was enforced because no duty was violated thereby.
Attention is called to the fact that in applying the principles of
regarding or disregarding the corporate entity, it is assumed that the
rights of third persons not before the court must not be prejudiced.
The court will not in applying the doctrine do so if third persons who
are not before the court, such as creditors or stockholders, are injured.
After all, it is only the right and convenience of the parties before
the court that is being served. The enforcement of the duty owing,
involving the doctrine of disregarding the corporate entity as a matter
of convenience, should not justify the enforcement of that duty at
the expense of third persons. Consequently, there is a class of decisions
that may be explained by the following principle:
2. Where the rights of a third party are not prejudiced, a corporate
entity may be disregarded in determining the rights of the immediate
1u93 F. (2d) 923 (C. C. A. 6th, 1938). However, ownership of every
share of stock by the person sought to be held liable is unnecessary. See
Sunset Farms v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. App. (2d) 389, 50 P. (2d) 106
(1935).
2"40 S. W. (2d) 817 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930).
1'38 F. (2d) 232 (C. C. A. 9th, 1930).
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parties interested as a matter of convenience to them (e. g., obviating
further litigation) in order to enforce a duty owing. The question of
overt intention is not here necessarily involved.
For example, in Oscarson v. Norton' a deed from all stockholders of
the property of a corporation was held effective to convey title (the
duty owing being thereby enforced), the stockholders being the persons
beneficially interested and there being no creditors or other third persons who would be prejudiced by such conveyance. Similarly in Western Securities Co. v. Spiro,'4 5 a corporation seeking to recover an indebtedness was held subject to a counterclaim or set-off in favor of the
defendant (who was owed the duty) and against the individual who
organized the corporation for the transaction of his personal business
and of the transactions involved and who was beneficial owner of all
of its shares of stock. The court treated the individual as the real
party in interest, i. e., the person beneficially interested. In Knight
v. Burns146 where a set-off under similar circumstances was permitted,
the court followed the reasoning of an earlier New York case, calling
attention to the fact that "no superior equities of third persons will
be affected by such adjustment", and that circuity of action would be
avoided-an obvious advantage gained by disregarding the corporate
47
entity.
The existing theories of abuse of corporate privilege, agency, identity,
and of the substance and justice rules, are, it is believed, rather general
ways of stating the specific principles above mentioned. Agency is a
relationship arising through mutual intention, actual or apparent.14 8
Identity is the theory most often relied on in cases of confusion of
assets or cases involving merged, consolidated or successor corporations in which the assets of the predecessor have been transferred
to the new corporation resulting in a practical physical identity. What
the parties have done manifests an intention to disregard the corporate
personality for proper purposes, such as the payment of the predecessor's debts. 1

49

Cases involving abuse of corporate privilege are cases

in which the intention to keep corporate entities separate is for the
purpose of evading duties created by law or contract; hence they are
frustrated. 150 The test of "justice" or "substance", even when combined
1439 F. (2d) 610 (C. C. A. 9th, 1930).
"'62 Utah 623, 221 Pac. 856 (1923).

"'22 Ohio App. 482, 154 N. E. 345 (1926).
"'See notes 60 and 116, supra.
'Kingston Dry Dock Co. v. Lake Champlain Transp. Co., 31 F. (2d)
265 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929).
"'Note reasoning in Blumenthal v. Schneider, 186 Wis. 588, 203 N. W.
393 (1925); Walker v. Rome, 6 Ga. App. 59, 64 S. E. 310 (1909); Shadford
v. Detroit Ry., 130 Mich. 300, 89 N. W. 960 (1902); see note 15, supra.

10See note 11, supra.
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with other tests,' 5 ' are but more vague ways of stating the tests here
suggested. Thus, to enforce a duty owing, i. e., to do justice, the entity
is disregarded. Again, when under the facts of a given case one corporation is manipulated for another's benefit (i. e., an overt intention
to disregard the entity of the manipulated corporation exists), the court
states it looks to the substance of the matter and disregards the entity
of the corporation in question. Even when overt intention to disregard
does not exist, and it is convenient to disregard the entity in order to
enforce a duty, the theory that the court looks through the form to
the substance in order to do justice is but a more general way of
1 52
stating the more specific second principle above mentioned.
It must be admitted that so far as express recognition of the tests
suggested is concerned, there is little in the decided cases or legal
writings on which to rely. 53s The tests suggested are as yet implicit
in the decisions rather than explicit. It must also be admitted that if
the tests suggested are accepted, a certain number of decisions will
be subject to criticism, either for failure to regard the corporate entity,
or for failure to disregard the corporate entity.5 4 Nevertheless, it is
believed that the principles suggested should lead to a proper adjustment of the balance that must be maintained between the legitimate
functions of corporation on the one hand, and the abuse of those functions on the other. 55
VII.
THE WASHNGTON LAW
The Washington cases are on the whole decided along the same lines
as are cases of other jurisdictions. Ordinarily the corporate entity will
not be disregarded. 56 Washington cases involving the disregard of the
corporate entity have assigned the usual reasons for applying the doc'See note 15, supra.
"'In First National Bank v. Walton, 146 Wash. 367, 262 Pac. 984 (1928),
and Sommer v. Yakima Motor Coach Company, 174 Wash. 638, 26 P. (2d)
92 (1933), intention is referred to but not developed. See also Costan v.
Manila Electric Co., 24 F. (2d) 383 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928); Exchange Nat. Bank
v. Meikle, 61 F. (2d) 176 (C. C. A. 9th, 1932); Trustees System Co. v.
Payne, 65 F. (2d) 103 (C. C. A. 3d, 1933); Phoenix Safety Investment
Co. v. James, 28 Ariz. 514, 237 Pac. 958 (1925); Pohlman Inv. Co. v. Virginia
City Gold Mining Co., 184 Wash. 273, 51 P. (2d) 363 (1935). Goodwin v.
Abilene State Bank, 294 S. W. 883 (Tex. Civ. App., 1927) held that whether
it was a separate entity "is largely a question of intention". Corker v.
Soper, 53 F. (2d) 190 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931) and Fors v. Farrell, 271 Mich.
358, 260 N. W. 886 (1935) (to avoid duty imposed by statute). See also
notes 19 and 20, supra.
21See note 144, supra.

1'See notes 171 and 172, infra.
usSee Section I, supra. Organization in different jurisdictions is not
controlling: Colonial Trust Co. v. Montello Brick Works, 172 Fed. 310 (C. C.
A. 3d, 1909); United Fuel & Gas Co. v. R. R. Comm., 13 F. (2d) 510 (E.
D. Ky., 1925); Williams v. Freeport Sulphur Co., 4Q S. W. (2d) 817 (Tex.
Civ. App., 1930); Associated Oil Co. v. Seiberling Rubber Co., 172 Wash.
204, 19 P. (2d) 940 (1933).
"'State ex rel. Tacoma v. Tacoma Ry. & P. Co., 61 Wash. 507, 112 Pac.
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trine: requirements of justice;' 7 prevention of fraud;" 8 disregard of
the corporate entity in practice by the parties, 2 9 as in cases of confusion of assets; 60 colorable or sham character of the corporate
entity;' 161 confusion of identities of individual and corporation or corporation and corporation. 62 Sometimes the court has assigned no particular reason but has implicitly recognized the rule that the form will
be disregarded and the substance considered.' 6 Finally the agency
theory has frequently been invoked.'

64

The later cases in Washington have attempted to formulate a rule on
the subject, at least insofar as corporate stockholders are concerned.
Thus, in Sommer v. Yakima Motor Coach Co. 6 the court approved
the following statement of the rule to be applied:
"In adjudicating two corporations to be in legal effect one,
506 (1911); Opportunity Christian Church v. Washington Water P. Co.,
136 Wash. 116, 238 Pac. 641 (1925); First National Bank v. Walton, 146
Wash. 367, 262 Pac. 984 (1928); Briggs & Co. v. Harper Clay Products Co.,
150 Wash. 235, 272 Pac. 962 (1928); Davis v. Bigelow Building Co., 150
Wash. 576, 274 Pac. 106 (1929); Pittsburgh Reflector Co. v. Dwyer &
Rhodes Co., 173 Wash. 552, 23 P. (2d) 1114 (1933); McCurdy v. Spokane
Western Power & Tr. Co., 174 Wash. 470, 24 P. (2d) 1075 (1933); Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Nilsen, 175 Wash. 237, 27 P. (2d) 128 (1933); State v.
Mahaffay, 192 Wash. 76, 72 P. (2d) 1028 (1937).
"r'Platt v. Bradner Co., 131 Wash. 573, 230 Pac. 633 (1924); First National
Bank v. Walton, 146 Wash. 367, 262 Pac. 984 (1928); Sommer v. Yakima
Motor Coach Co., 174 Wash. 638, 26 P. (2d) 92 (1933).
'First National Bank v. Walton, 146 Wash. 367, 262 Pac. 984 (1928);
Briggs & Co. v. Harper Clay Products Co., 150 Wash. 235, 272 Pac. 962
(1928); Davis v. Bigelow Building Co., 150 Wash. 576, 274 Pac. 106 (1929);
Associated Oil Co. v. Seiberling Rubber Co., 172 Wash. 204, 19 P. (2d) 940
(1933) (intentional fraud not necessary); Garvin v. Matthews, 193 Wash.
152, 74 P. (2d) 990 (1938). See also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Nilsen, 175
Wash. 237, 27 P. (2d) 128 (1933) ("organized in good faith").
"'Spokane Merchants Ass'n v. Clere Clothing Co., 84 Wash. 616, 147
Pac. 414 (1915); Pohlman Inv. Co. v. Virginia City Co., 184 Wash. 273, 51
P. (2d) 363 (1935).
'"ORoberts v. Hilton Land Co., 45 Wash. 464, 88 Pac. 946 (1907); Keane
v. Watson Co., 149 Wash. 424, 271 Pac. 73 (1928); Associated Oil Co. v.
Seiberling Rubber Co., 172 Wash. 204, 19 P. (2d) 940 (1933); Celian v.
Coast Finance Corp., 189 Wash. 676, 66 P. (2d) 363 (1937). No confusion
of assets but improper purpose, corporate entity disregarded: State v.
Davies, 176 Wash. 100, 28 P. (2d) 322 (1934); Kelley v. Von Herberg, 184
Wash. 165, 183, 50 P. (2d) 23 (1935); Allman Hubble Tugboat Co. v.
Reliance Develop. Corp., 193 Wash. 234, 74 P. (2d) 985 (1938).
" 'Spokane Merchants Ass'n v. Clere Clothing Co., 84 Wash. 616, 147
Pac. 414 (1915); Clark v. Schwaegler, 104 Wash. 12, 175 Pac. 300 (1918);
The National Bank of Commerce 'of Seattle v. Dunn, 194 Wash. 472, 78
P. (2d) 535 (1938); Allman Hubble Tugboat Co. v. Reliance Development
Corporation, 193 Wash. 234, 74 P. (2d) 985 (1938).
'°Roberts v. Hilton Land Co., 45 Wash. 464, 88 Pac. 946 (1907); Clark
v. Schwaegler, 104 Wash. 12, 175 Pac. 300 (1918); Sheffield Co. v. Hoe
& Co., 173 Wash. 489, 23 P. (2d) 876 (1933); Garvin v. Matthews, 193 Wash.
152, 74 P. (2d) 990 (1938).
' 'See note 161, supra.
"'Mitchell v. Lea Lumber Co., 43 Wash. 195, 86 Pac. 405 (1906); Spokane
Merchants Ass'n v. Clere Clothing Co., 84 Wash. 616, 147 Pac. 414 (1915);
DeLano v. Tennent, 138 Wash. 39, 244 Pac. 273 (1926); Wilson v. Washington Concrete Pipe Co., 178 Wash. 545, 35 P. (2d) 71 (1934); Celian v.
Coast Finance Corp., 189 Wash. 676, 66 P. (2d) 363 (1937).
" 174 Wash. 638, 657, 26 P. (2d) 92, 99 (1933).
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it must appear that the one so dominates and controls the
others as to make the other a mere tool or instrument of the
one so that justice requires the dominant corporation to be
held responsible for the results, and further, that there shall
be such a commingling of their funds and property interests,
and their affairs so intimately related in management that to
consider them other than as one would work a fraud upon
third persons."
It is interesting to note that while the rule thus stated requires the
existence of two elements, 1 6 an earlier statement of the rule required
the existence of one or the other of the elements mentioned. 1 7 The
rule laid down in the Sominer case is unduly restrictive under the
decisions both in Washington and elsewhere. It is subject to criticism,
not only on account of its somewhat general and indefinite character
and its use of terms "tool", "instrument", "justice", "fraud", but also
because it fails to provide for the case of corporate entity intended to
be disregarded for proper purposes.'8 8 Furthermore, it fails to take
into account cases involving the second principle above discussed not
without illustration in Washington. 69 Nevertheless it is one of the few
cases suggesting that intention to regard or disregard corporate entity
is of juridical importance.
Although the tests for disregarding the corporate entity suggested
in this paper have not been in express terms adopted in this state, an
examination of Washington cases shows that with rare exception all
the cases may be explained by such principles. The Washington cases
are classified in the footnotes. 7 0
If the principles announced in this paper are correct, the statement
2"Pittsburgh Reflector Co. v. Dwyer & Rhodes Co., 173 Wash. 552, 23
P. (2d) 1114 (1933); McCurdy v. Spokane Western Power & Tr. Co., 174
Wash. 470, 496, 24 P. (2d) 1075 (1933); Garvin v. Matthews, 193 Wash.
P. (2d) 990 (1938).
152, 74
'"T ittsburgh Reflector Co. v. Dwyer & Rhodes Co., 173 Wash. 552, 23
P. (2d) 1114 (1933).
"'See .note 137, supra.
"c'See notes 144 to 147, supra, and Sheffield Co. v. Hoe & Co., 173 Wash.
489, 23 P. (2d) 876 (1933); see note 170 (d), infra.
°(a) Overt intention to disregard enforced when no duty violated:
Mitchell v. Lea Lumber Co., 43 Wash. 195, 86 Pac. 405 (1906); Roberts
v. Hilton Land Co., 45 Wash. 464, 88 Pac. 946 (1907); Spokane Merchants
Ass'n v. Clere Clothing Co., 84 Wash. 616, 147 Pac. 414 (1915); DeLano v.
Tennent, 138 Wash. 39, 244 Pac. 273 (1926); Keane v. Watson Co., 149 Wash.
424, 271 Pac. 73 (1928); Wilson v. Washington Concrete Pipe Co., 178 Wash.
545, 35 P. (2d) 71 (1934); Pohlman Inv.Co. v. Virginia City Co., 184 Wash.
273, 51 P. (2d) 363 (1935); Deno v. Standard Furniture Co., 190 Wash. 1,
66 P. (2d) 1158 (1937).
(b) In the following cases the intention to regard the corporate entity
for an improper purpose was frustrated. In some of the following cases
principle (a) above might alternatively be applicable as explained in
note 137a, supra. Platt v. Bradner Co., 131 Wash. 573, 230 Pac. 633 (1924);
Associated Oil Co. v. Seiberling Rubber Co., 172 Wash. 204, 19 P. (2d)
940 (1933); State v. Davies, 176 Wash. 100, 28 P. (2d) 322 (1934); Kelley
v. Von Herberg, 184 Wash. 165, 50 P. (2d) 23 (1935); Allman Hubble T.
Co. v. Reliance Dev. Corp., 193 Wash. 234, 74 P. (2d) 985 (1938).
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7
of the doctrine of disregard in the case of Garvin v. Mathews" ' and
2
the decision of National Bank of Commerce of Seattle v. Dunn" must
be deemed in conflict with them. The Garvin case correctly holds that
a corporation cannot sue its stockholder merely because it is his alter
ego. No duty owed is violated. The court, however, in stating that
the doctrine of disregard can be invoked only "at the behest of third
parties" sustaining injury, unduly restricts the application of the doctrine. Thus in a suit between stockholders to determine their rights
inter se, or in a suit for divorce involving a family corporation, the
doctrine of disregard should be applicable under the second test here-

tofore suggested .

7

In the Dunn case the assignee of the lease to stop liability for
future rent reassigned it to a corporation organized by him, nearly all
of whose stock he owned. The lease contained no covenant to pay
rent, nor a prohibition against reassignment. The corporation, though
managed by Dunn, was continuously kept separate and apart from his
personal affairs and in good faith regarded by him as a separate
entity. No duty being violated, the entity under the overt intention
test should have been regarded. The court, however, disregarded the
entity and held the reassignment ineffective as colorable. Had the
holding been predicated on the basis that the corporation was Dunn's
agent, rather than a separate entity, the decision would have been consistent with the test suggested, but the decision does not seem to be
74
predicated upon that view.1

CONCLUSION

There is nothing particularly new about the concepts of intention
and purpose in our law. Nor is the device of disregarding corporate
entity in light of intention, purpose or convenience, without analogy
in other branches of the law. It is the suggestion of this paper, however,
that the doctrine of disregarding the corporate entity should be utilized
in light of these fundamental concepts. If this is done, the whole
subject is illuminated by the rich experience of other branches of the
law and it becomes an easier task to extend legitimate protection to
stockholders and at the same time to prevent unwarranted injury to
others.
(c) Overt intention to regard enforced when no duty violated:

The

cases are set forth in note 156, supra. See also Pacific Power & Light Co.
v. Norris, 194 Wash. 91, 77 P. (2d) 379 (1938). National Bank of Commerce
v. Dunn, 194 Wash. 472, 78 P. (2d) 535 (1938), violates this rule.
(d) Third parties not being prejudiced, corporate entity is disregarded
irrespective of overt intent: Clark v. Schwaegler, 104 Wash. 12, 175 Pac.
300 (1918); Sheffield Co. v. Hoe & Co., 173 Wash. 489, 23 P. (2d) 876 (1933).
Cf. Stewart v. Gould, 8 Wash. 367, 36 Pac. 277 (1894).
"193 Wash. 152, 156, 74 P. (2d) 990 (1938).
"2194 Wash. 472, 78 P. (2d) 535 (1938).
"'See Sections V and VI and note 169, supra.
"See notes 15 and 170 (c), supra.

